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Abstract. Several formal approaches have been proposed to analyse
security protocols, e.g. [2,7,11,1,6,12]. Recently, a great interest has been
growing on the use of constraint solving approach. Initially proposed
by Millen and Shmatikov [9], this approach allows analysis of a finite
number of protocol sessions. Yet, the representation of protocol runs by
symbolic traces (as opposed to concrete traces) captures the possibility
of having unbounded message space, allowing analysis over an infinite
state space. A constraint is defined as a pair consisting of a message M
and a set of messages K that represents the intruder’s knowledge. Millen
and Shmatikov present a procedure to solve a set of constraints, i.e. that
in each constraint, M can be built from K. When a set of constraints
is solved, then a concrete trace representing an attack over the protocol
can be extracted.
Corin and Etalle [4] has improved the work of Millen and Shmatikov
by presenting a more efficient procedure. However, none of these
constraint-based systems provide enough flexibility and expresiveness in
specifying security properties. For example, to check secrecy an artificial
protocol role is added to simulate whether a secret can be learned by
an intruder. Authentication cannot also be checked directly. Moreover,
only a built-in notion of authentication is implemented by Millen and
Shmatikov in his Prolog implementation [10]. This problem motivates
our current work.
A logical formalism is considered to be an appropriate solution to
improve the flexibility and expresiveness in specifying security properties.
A preliminary attempt to use logic for specifying local security properties
in a constraint-based setting has been carried out [3]. Inspired by this
work and the successful NPATRL [11,8], we currently explores a variant
of linear temporal logic (LTL) over finite traces, PS-LTL , standing
for pure-past security LTL [5]. In contrast to standard LTL, this logic
deals only with past events in a trace. In our current work, a protocol is
modelled as in previous works [9,4,3], viz. by protocol roles. A protocol
role is a sequence of send and receive events, together with status events
to indicate, e.g. that a protocol role has completed her protocol run. A
scenario is then used to deal with the number of sessions and protocol
roles considered in the analysis.
Integrating PS-LTL into our constraint solving approach presents a
challenge, since we need to develop a sound and complete decision pro-
cedure against symbolic traces, instead of concrete traces. Our idea to
address this problem is by concretizing symbolic traces incrementally
while deciding a formula. Basically, the decision procedure consists of
two steps: transform and decide. The former step transforms a PS-LTL
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formula with respect to the current trace into a so-called elementary
formula that is built from constraints and equalities using logical con-
nectives and quantifiers. The decision is then performed by the latter
step through solving the constraints and checking the equalities.
Although we define a decision procedure for a fragment of PS-LTL ,
this fragment is expressive enough to specify several security properties,
like various notions of secrecy and authentication, and also data fresh-
ness. We provide a Prolog implementation and have analysed several
security protocols.
There are many directions for improvement. From the implementa-
tion point of view, the efficiency of the decision procedure can still be
improved. I would also like to investigate the expressiveness of the logic
for speficying other security properties. This may result in an extension
of the decision procedure for a larger fragment of the logic. Another di-
rection is to characterize the expressivity power of PS-LTL compared to
other security requirement languages.
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